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Abstract
This paper aims to argue for, else illustrate the epistemological signif-
icance of the use of non transitive similarity relations, mapping only to
”types”1, as methodologically being on a par with the use of transitive sim-
ilarity relations (equivalence relations), mapping as well to ”predicates”.
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1a ”type”, for short, is given by a non empty set of paradigms and a (transitive or non transitive)
similarity relation, relating at least the paradigms in some way.
1
1 Introduction
The well known basic fact, that an equivalence relation scatters (splits up)
it’s domain into a set of mutually disjoint equivalence classes, while a non tran-
sitive similarity relation does not, is here of central importance. The point is
hence, that, because equivalence classes are not available for non transitive simi-
larity relations, a non transitive similarity relation may not be taken to generate
a predicate (neither an unary nor in the general case an n-ary predicate), while
a transitive does.2
Thus, use of types with their tokens, of paradigms with their implementa-
tions, ... while logically and hence methodologically unobjectionable, is not in
general equivalent to the use of predicates in the standard sense; i.e.: predicates
[with a sharply determined extension] are only a very special case of types, viz.
those determined by a transitive similarity relation.
Readers not used to formal considerations might skip section(2), viz. the
recapitulation of an exact model of the above construct, and start reading with
section(3); though not without loss of content, as the model - which is an ex-
tremely simple geometric one - does not only allow to map available similarity
comparisons and/or similarity measurements to the model, but allows also in
some obvious way for visualization of the mapped similarity information.
In section(3), use cases for non transitive similarity relations from science
and humanities are mentioned, in section(4) a metaphysics example is expanded
to some extent.
2 similarity relations: definition and trigono-
metric interpretation - a short recapitulation
In my recent ’note on Sorites series’ ([11] section 2, pp.2-4), a very general
and straightforward definition of similarity relations was used (2-place relations,
reflexive, symmetric, may or may not be transitive), thus having equivalence
relations as a special case ([11] section 2.1) , and I introduced an “imagination
supporting” elementary trigonometric model in Euclidean space. This model
consists of a domain of line segments of equal length and arbitrary directions, the
domain is closed with respect to linear and parallel translation (rotation does not
belong to the model, Euclidean distance does). ”similarity” between 2 objects of
2A predicate is said to be generated from an equivalence relation, iff the union of some
equivalence classes is taken as the extension of the predicate, and the union of the remain-
ing equivalence classes as the complement of the predicate’s extension in the domain. On the
other hand, any n-ary predicate Px1, ...,xn is accompanied by the trivial equivalence relation
Px1, ...,xn ↔ Py1, ...,yn, especially in the unary case Px is accompanied by Px ↔ Py.
Less common, but useful for generalization in talk of similarity relations is the following obser-
vation: to any predicate P there exists its type TP, coinciding with the predicate’s extension P:
from any equivalence class, whose union is the predicate’s extension P, select one member, they
altogether forming the paradigm set PDP. The type TP is then specified as the smallest set,
including any object similar to a an element of the paradigm set PDP, where the (in this case
transitive) similarity relation is simply the equivalence relation, that creates the equivalence classes.
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the domain (= 2 line segments) in this model is pictured by the smallest angle
α, these 2 line segments include as isosceles, when suitably mapped by linear
and parallel translations. Obviously this smallest angle is 0° ≤ α ≤ 90°. Two
objects (isosceles line segments) are (more or less) similar, if 0° ≤ α ≤ 60° [3] ,
otherwise (more or less) not similar ([11] section 2.2). The model does serve
not only as a model of comparative similarity as just described, but also as a
model for similarity by degree ([11] section 2.3). While I did not explicitly state
in the originating paper,a natural choice for the respective similarity measure4
might of course be cos α for being monotone in the first quadrant, and in case
α = 0° (isosceles line segments coincide), then cos α = 1, and in case α = 90°,
then cos α = 0 [5]; additionally welcome is cos 60° = 0,5 [6]. Lastly ([11] section
2.4.1) gives a general formula for a Sorites series Fa1, . . . ,¬Fan chained by a
non transitive 2-place similarity relation S, viz.
F a1 ∧ S a1,a2 ∧ ... ∧ S ai−1,ai ∧ S ai,ai+1 ∧ ¬S ai−k,k<i,ai+1 ∧ ¬F ai+1 ...
3 use cases for ( mostly non transitive ) simi-
larity relations
3.1 historical and other preliminary remarks
What we are about here, is to strive for the recognition of non transitive simi-
larity as a logically consistent and scientifically fully legitimate logical means for
the study of typologies/taxonomies, cluster phenomena, some sorts of claimed
vagueness of concepts, and the like, without any need to resort to whatever
kind of non standard logic (modal, many-valued, para-consistent, ...) for this
purpose.
The related explicit methodological discussion historically started with the
groundbreaking debate between William Whewell and John Stuart Mill on
whether ’natural groups’ are ’given by type, not by definition’, referring to the
botanic type example ’the rose family(=rosaceae)’7. This debate - while not in
3in case α = 0° the isosceles coincide, hence the isosceles triangle collapses into the isosceles line
segment, in case α = 60° the isosceles triangle is also an equilateral triangle, thus the length of the
opposite side is equal to the isosceles’ length. And in case α = 90° the length of the opposite side of
the then right-angled isosceles triangle is of course the square root of 2, if the length of the isosceles
equals 1 (, as we can always assume).
4”In statistics and related fields, a similarity measure or similarity function is a real-valued
function that quantifies the similarity between two objects. Although no single definition of a
similarity measure exists, usually such measures are in some sense the inverse of distance metrics:
they take on large values for similar objects and either zero or a negative value for very dissimilar
objects.” wikipedia article ”similarity measure” [23], p.1
5in [11] I referred to respective axioms T1-T5 from Timothy Williamson’s [24], pp.461f., and
its obvious, that cos α in the first quadrant satisfies Williamsons requirements for a respective
similarity measure M1 −M4 op.cit. p.459
6this effect depends of course on the deliberate choice of cos α as the similarity measure (helping
again for visualization). Else other monotone mappings to [1,0]⊂ IR could serve as a similarity
measure as well.
7the most crucial passages at Whewell [18] Chapt. II,§9 Difference of Natural History and
Mathematics, and §10 Natural Groups given by Type, not by Definition, pp. 121 f., and Mill
[13],Chapt. VII, § 4, pp. 278ff., especially p.282, have been cited in my ’note on Sorites series’
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the least having been settled - to my best knowledge was discontinued thereafter.
In the sequel, it seems that the rapid development of formal logic and logic based
philosophy of science throughout the twentieth century had plowed this sensi-
tive epistemological topic, which - presumably for alleged epistemic inferiority
- remained mostly outside the attention of logical empiricism. Discussions on
’natural properties’ starting say from the fifties onward, e.g. Nelson Goodman’s
”grue”, while rightly reminding us, that the predicates (and for that, the similar-
ity relations) considered should prove some inductive value8, does not directly
touch on the debate, of ’given by type vs. given by definition’. And also Quine,
in his lecture on ’Natural Kinds’, while pointing convincingly to the intimate
correlation between natural kinds and similarity, does not pay special attention
to non transitive similarity. His considering natural kinds as ’sets’ does not
differentiate between transitive and non transitive similarity9. And he strictly
judges use of natural kinds in science as epistemically inferior10. Again from late
discussion, the assumption of ’essential’ else ’intrinsic’ properties (for belonging
to a species), see e.g. Richard Boyd [4], seems somewhat question begging in
our context, at least as far as this assumption is meant to imply/presuppose the
possibility of natural groups generally ’given by definition’.
Now, of course, lots of everyday judgments and perceptions are based on,
or presuppose, judgments of (dis)similarity, and as well to a considerable ex-
tent even scientific judgments do11, and in the age of industry and informa-
tion technology also lots of technical processes depend on determination of
(dis)similarities, and one might have the impression, that in almost all sig-
nificant cases, the similarity relations involved concern domains, in which they
8[10] pp. 72-81
9thus Quine considers the proposal ”If without serious loss of accuracy we can assume that there
are one or more actual things (paradigm cases) that nicely exemplify the desired norm, and one ore
more actual things (foils) that deviate just barely too much to be counted in the desired kind at
all, then our definition is easy: the kind with paradigm a and foil b is the set of all the things to
which a is more similar than a is to b. More generally, then, a set may be said to be a kind if and
only if there are a and b, known or unknown, such that the set is the kind with paradigm a and foil
b.”[16], pp. 119f.
10”In general, we can take it as (as we can always assume) a very special mark of the maturity
of a branch of science that it no longer needs an irreducible notion of similarity and kind. ... In
[this] career of the similarity notion, starting in its innate phase, developing over the years in the
light of accumulated experience, passing them from the intuitive phase into theoretical similarity,
and finally (as we can always assume)appearing altogether, we have a paradigm of the evolution of
unreason into science”[16], p. 138
11there is an important remark of Whewell in the already cited context, on the coining and the
reliability of scientific knowledge generated with use of ”types”, and here is the full text of this
remark:
”11. It has already been repeatedly stated, as the great rule of all classification, that the classi-
fication must serve to assert general propositions. It may be asked what propositions we are able
to enunciate by means of such classifications as we are now treating of. And the answer is, that
the collected knowledge of the characters, habits, properties, organization, and functions of these
groups and families, as it is found in the best botanical works, and as it exists in the mind of the
best botanists, exhibits to us the propositions which constitute the science, and to the expression of
which the classification is to serve. All that is not strictly definition, that is, all that is not artificial
character, in the description of such classes, is a statement of truths, more or less general, more or
less precise, but making up, together, the positive knowledge which constitutes the science. As we
have said, the consideration of the properties of plants in order to form a system of classification,
has been termed Taxonomy, or the Systematick of Botany; all the parts of the descriptions,which,
taking the system for granted, convey additional information, are termed the Physiography of the
science; and the same terms may be applied in the other branches of Natural History.” ([18] Chapt.
II,§11, pp. 122f.)
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are not in general transitive.
Although we are really well acquainted with the ubiquitous presence of simi-
larity judgments, let’s just mention some use cases, to recall the epistemic flavor
of that ’knowledge by acquaintance’ of uses of similarity, as we here intend a
bit of ’knowledge by description’ of them, to borrow for sake of shortness from
Russell’s terminology
3.2 mentioning use cases for similarity by degree
Similarity by degree is of course not restricted to non transitive similarity re-
lations, but these, I think, are well expected to make the prominent use cases
thereof.
Without having the expertise to get into respective mathematical detail, I
take it for granted here, that similarity by degree is used with algorithms for
cluster analysis and more generally for pattern recognition.12. This includes,
but won’t be restricted to, applications on a wide variety of technical devices,
e.g. a plant recognition app on a smart phone.
There is a more traditional well known application of similarity by degree
too, it’s an industrial one and concerns rolling element bearings, as used e.g.
in a car. For the performance (e.g. friction from rolling resistance) of such
bearings, the precision of produced rolling elements (balls, rollers,... ), wrt e.g.
diameter deviations, has to be secured.
3.3 mentioning use cases - mostly from taxonomy
3.3.1 taxonomy in biology
Again, without being an expert in biology, rather obviously, the taxonomy
framework in biology has changed significantly, since Whewell published his
’History of Scientific Ideas’ in 1858. Already C.G. Hempel in his ’Fundamen-
tals of Taxonomy’ (1965) mentions a switch from the primarily morphological
to the phylogenetic taxonomy paradigm, and welcomes it as a definite progress
(Hempel [12], p. 147 f.),which it obviously is13. But, as any approach is accom-
panied by its own difficulties, there seem to exist paraphyletic and polyphyletic
exceptions to the targeted monophyletic structures14. And it will be interesting,
how much of the evolution theorist’s apparent preference for monophyletic trees
will in the long run turn out to be substantiated by computational phylogenetics.
Anyway, the involvement of similarity considerations in various ways in this
field of research (e.g. in comparing aligned DNA sequences [similarity by degree,
I guess], in selecting a most plausible phylogenetic branching pattern, if DNA
sequences evidence is not already conclusive, ...) seems obvious. And, of course
very important, concerning this use case, are first, the switch from mostly com-
parative similarity to mostly similarity by degree (enabled by a change of the
12reference here is to the respective articles ”cluster analysis”[21] and ”pattern recognition”[22] in
wikipedia.
13perhaps a characteristic facet of the resulting situation is given by ”traditional morphological
analysis and analysis based on genetic data give us different phylogenetic trees ...” and a resulting
question ”[How] can we reach an equilibrium between classical and molecular classifications ?” I’m
indebted to Professor Emeritus Ahmed Thandar, marine biologist at the University of KwaZulu-
Natal, for this light shedding remark (in personal communication). Any errors or inadequacies in
referring to his remark are entirely mine
14reference is to articles ”cladistics” [19], ”computational phylogenetics” [20] etc. in wikipedia
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object domain of inquiry to molecular facts), and secondly, the use of computa-
tional methods (algorithms) in determining and evaluating similarities.
3.3.2 in the humanities
And again, without being an humanities expert, there are some well known
fields of study in the humanities, which could well be imagined their research
objects being grouped by similarities, which in the general case will turn out to
be non transitive similarities15. Some cases, coming to my mind immediately:
- comparative study of structure, growth, performance and decline of cities
(in history and contemporary, synchronous or asynchronous )
- comparative study of formal and informal structure of organizations16
- on behalf of whatever enterprises or political groups, cluster analysis (using
presumably similarity by degree) to select target groups
- for advertising, e.g. from evaluating data warehoused customer data
- for advertising else influencing, e.g. from evaluating user data of social
media communities .
4 metaphysics use case in exempting Plato’s
theory of forms from Aristotle’s criticism ?
4.1 disclaimer
Now, when recalling the historical origin of the seemingly endless debate ’on
the relation of universals and particulars’ (Russell’s wording), viz., Aristotle’s
criticism of his picture of Plato’s theory of forms in ’metaphysics’ M9 as my
example, and then try a defense of Plato’s theory of forms by use of twentieth
century first order logic, the anachronism is obvious, and anything I judge from
this rather modern perspective may be criticized as inadequate or unjust to the
historical players for this anachronistic procedere, and may as well be criticized
for that text details may disallow my favored interpretation. My answer is, that
my intention is not so much a historical, but a systematic one, and the simple
reason, why then for heaven’s sake I chose to select that historical origin for
my case study is, that for getting an acceptable level of understanding of the
problem, we have to some extent to realize and respect the use and intentions of
the theory of forms in Plato’s dialogues and only thence of Aristotle’s picturing
it. So I will try a balancing act between historical scrutiny to some extent and
mapping part of the debate to the standard logic of our days.
15some attention to the use of types in the social sciences is given a in C.G. Hempel’s ’Typological
Methods in the Natural and the Social Sciences’ [12] pp. 155-171
16reference is to Encyclopedia Britannica [8], [17]
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4.2 the story
Let’s now set the stage for the logical case study involving similarity, led by
some scholarly work in the area, viz. Laura M. Castelli ’Universals, Particulars
and Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s Forms’[6](2013) mainly for referencing Aris-
totle’s view, and R. E. Allen ’Participation and Predication in Plato’s Middle
Dialogues’[1](1960) for a line of defense in favor of Plato’s theory of forms/ideas.
Allen’s paper is also referred to by Castelli.
4.2.1 the attack
In part I ’The ontological status of Platonic Forms and the difficulties it poses’
of her comprehensive paper Laura M. Castelli discusses as a main point the
ἀπορία from metaphysics M9 which, according to Aristotle’s coining of the case,
the defenders of the theory of forms/ideas cannot avoid.
Aristotle claims, that the defenders of the theory of forms/ideas17 run into
a difficulty close to a blatant contradiction18, in Aristotle’s own words (in Ross
translation) of [3] M9 1086a32-35: ... For they at the same time make the Ideas
universal and again treat them as separable and as individuals. That this is not
possible has been argued before19...
For interpretation and evaluation, attention is drawn by Castelli to an arse-
nal of further text passages, let’s select only some:
A6, 987b1 : ... Socrates, however, was busying himself about ethical matters
and ... seeking the universal (καθόλου) in these ethical matters, and fixed
thought for the first time on definitions(ὁρισμῶν); ...
the passage continues
A6, 987 b4-b14: ... Plato accepted his teaching but held that the problem
not applied to sensible things but to entities of another kind ... Things of this
other sort, then he called Ideas, and sensible things, he said, were all named
after these, and in virtue of a relation to these; for the many existed by par-
ticipation (μέθεξις) in the Ideas that have the same name as they. Only the
name ‘participation’ was new; for the Pythagoreans say that things exist by
’imitation’ [of numbers20] and Plato says they exist by participation, changing
the name. But what the participation or the imitation(μιμήσις) could be they
left an open question. ...
For the important passage on the role of universals for knowledge let’s cite
from Castelli’s summarizing Aristotle’s point of view:
”The problem is presented in Met., B4, 999a26-32 in the following terms: if
there is nothing over and above particulars (τὰ δὲ καθ᾿ ἕκαστα) and particulars
are in(de)finite (ἄπειρα), there can be no ἐπιστήμη. Therefore there must be
17”... In his reports Aristotle uses the Greek equivalents of both ’Forms’ and ’Ideas’ (εἶδος and
ἰδέα respectively), both appearing in the dialogues as well.” Castelli [6], p. 139, note 1
18met. [3] M9, 1086a24-b14
19for the ontological difference between particulars and universals, besides others, some passages
of Z13 are prominent ones,
Z13 1038b35-1039a1 ( ... no universal attribute is a substance ... )
1040a8-a9 ( Nor is it possible to define any idea. For the idea is, as the supporters say, an
individual and can exist apart ... )
this latter passage but question begging as relying on the questionable truth of B3, 999b26-
29,(referred to by Castelli [6], p. 143, see below)
20my exclusion
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something which makes all things knowable in as much as it is one and the same
(ᾗ ἕν τι καὶ ταὐτόν), universal (ᾗ καθόλου) or common to many things. But if
this is the case, there must be something which is over and above particulars.”
Castelli[6], p.143
4.2.2 the defense line
In a later section of the paper, ’1.4. Paradigms, separation and the particularity
of Forms’, Castelli mentions and discusses a line of defense in favor of Plato’s
theory of forms based on the claim, that forms/ideas are not universals but
paradigms21.
For details of a description of Plato’s theory of forms/ideas which allows
for this defense I’m going to cite from R. E. Allen’s ’Participation and Predi-
cation in Plato’s Middle Dialogues’[1][1960], especially from Allen’s sections II
(Plato’s Theory of Predication), III(Imitation and Degrees of Reality), and V
(Participation):
” II. Plato’s Theory of Predication
Plato has no word for "predication." Rather he says that particulars are
"called by the same name" (ὁμώνυμον) as their Form.
...
Each of the Forms exists, and the other things which come to have a share
in them are named after them. The reason for naming particulars after Forms
is that they have in them an immanent character defined by their Form: ...
...
Not only is the Form itself always entitled to its own name, but also what is
not the Form, but always has, when it exists, its immanent character (μορφή).
...
These passages imply that "F" is a name, a name whose prime designate is
a Form: "F" names the F. But this name is also applied, through what we may
call derivative designation, to particulars, which are named after the Form in
much the way that a boy may be named after his father. The reason for this,
the justification for derivative designation, is that particulars have in them the
immanent character defined by their Form; or, to put the matter in a slightly
different way, they are named after the Form because of their peculiarly intimate
relation to it-they depend upon it for their character and their existence.
We have, then, a theory of predication without predicates.” [1], pp.149-150
” III. Imitation and Degrees of Reality
The theory of Forms involves two fundamental doctrines: (a) that the rela-
tion between particulars and Forms is that of imitation, of copy to original, and
(b) that Forms and particulars differ in degree of reality.”
”V. Participation
...
The particular objects of sense are unified by a One which stands on a differ-
ent level of reality from theirs; their community of character is to be explained
21the tradition of this line of defense, we learn, started with work of P.T. Geach in 1956, followed
by work of R. E. Allen and other scholars, see [6], pp. 152ff
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by the introduction of Forms. Unity and diversity are reconciled if we posit
the existence of two domains, Being and Becoming, a world of particulars, of
things unified, and a world of Forms, their unity. To understand the One and
the Many, we must understand that the One is over the Many. ...” [1], p.160
The pros and cons for this line of defense, considered by scholars in the
field, pertain to items of rather equal antiquity like ’the third man’ (understood
from Plato’s Parmenides dialogue), or by a related topic, ’self-predication’, a
rather dubious ’logical’ characterization, but interpolated from some of Plato’s
dialogues, and seemingly current in the field. Allen, who contests (imop rightly)
the alleged ’self-reference’, explains the provenance of the item:
” ... Plato obviously accepts the following thesis: some (perhaps all) entities
which may be designated by a phrase of the form "the F Itself," or any synonyms
thereof, may be called F. So the Beautiful Itself will be beautiful, the Just
Itself just, Equality equal. ...” and Allen points to respective text passages in
’Protagoras’, ’Phaedo’ and others [[1], section I. Self-Predication, p.148]
At this stage I leave the scholarly discussion and try a free logical construct,
inspired by the scenario, developed so far.
4.3 the defense constructed as a similarity use case
The following logical construct shall picture the given scenario to some extent,
and show release from the impression of an aporetic epistemic situation.22
4.3.1 target of construction
From Allen’s exposition one takes easily, that in Plato’s theory of forms sensible
particulars are mapped by their ’immanent character’ to their form.
We make use of the assumption, that this mapping may be well consid-
ered to be a mapping or function in the mathematical sense (viz., providing a
uniquely determined function value for each of it’s arguments). This - in context
- amounts to constructing a mapping or function, the set of arguments of this
function - it’s domain - is a union of (not necessarily mutually disjoint) subsets
of concrete (e.g. sensible) particulars23. The value of the mapping for a spe-
cial argument (i.e. for a special concrete particulars from this union set) is the
22There is already a fairly formal account of the respective logical structure of Plato’s view in
P.T. Geach’s article of 1956, that started the ’paradigm defense line’ discussion, viz.
”I shall now state in an abstract logical way what seem to me to be Plato’s implicit assumptions
in the TMA (and the presuppositions of the Broadman-Izzard discussion).
(i) There is a set consisting just of the many Fs that are not Forms.
(2) If x is a Form by which y is made to be an F, then y is not a Form by which x is made to be
an F.
(3) If A is a set of several Fs, and x is an F not belonging to A, then there is a set of Fs containing
just the members of A together with x. (I shall call this set "A plus x.")
(4a) Some F is a Form by which all other Fs are made to be Fs.
(4b) Any set consisting of several Fs are all of them made to be Fs by a Form that is itself an F.
”([9], pp. 77 f).
I do not follow Geach’s further exposition in that paper. The problem - in my view - is not, that
these four theses are taken to reformulate Plato’s view; in the opposite, I do agree more or less with
each of them. My point of disagreement is rather with what in the sequel is assumed by Geach to
follow from them, especially wrt his reading of the ’Parmenides’. But this would need a discussion
of its own, and is not my focus here.
23while, with regard to Plato’s dialogues, we might perhaps be inclined to restrict discussion
to sensible particulars, the general case of particulars covered here is but somewhat more broadly
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form/idea, the respective particular is said to participate in by implementing
its character. The construct is intended to sketch such a mapping and to some
extent show it’s trade off.
4.3.2 construction
1. The set of concrete particulars be pre-structured by (epistemically relevant,
but hitherto not sufficiently analyzed) similarities in sample sets (these not
necessarily mutually disjoint).
2. By analyzing prominent examples of such epistemically relevant similar-
ity samples (e.g. of natural kinds) with regard to their properties, and by some
steps of abstraction (by propositional invariance, and, in case of gradable prop-
erties of the analyzed examples, by optionally postulating a maximal value of
that property), in case of successful analysis we end up with a concept cluster
abstracted from the prominent examples24. This concept cluster is taken to
characterize
an abstract particular, uniquely determined by this concept cluster25
that concept cluster being it’s definite description
3. Hence, there is for any such successful analysis of selected examples, a
unique abstract particular, being the only particular implementing this concept
cluster in full. We use the big latin letter ’F’ to refer to the concept cluster, which
is a complex predicate [picturing Allen’s immanent character(μορφή)], and the
0-ary function symbol ’i0’ to refer to the abstract particular, and write F( i0)
[ or, omitting brackets: Fi0 ], to refer to the abstract particular’s implementing
this concept cluster in full,
this usage of the 0-ary function symbol i0 presupposing
⋁y [ Fy ∧ ⋀x( Fx → x = y ) ] [ existence and uniqueness, secured by F ]
4. Now, having available the abstract particular i0, our formal analogon of
a Platonic form/idea, we have to spell out the use of this abstract particular,
uniquely identified by it’s cluster concept, in giving a formal picture of the
theory of forms:
construed: concrete (maybe or not sensible) objects, as e.g. a city, an organization (from the
humanities use cases mentioned in section (3)) are concrete particulars, squares or triangles in
pure geometry abstract particulars , drawn in the sand squares or triangles are concrete sensible
particulars. ”concrete” is here used in a usual way as opposed to ”abstract”
24introducing a ’concept cluster’ as a means of logical reconstruction is not new in the context.
E.g. Castelli, in another paper [5] makes a try, when tracing ... the problem of the universality or
individuality of forms ... in Aristotle. And in that paper, she is critical on this kind of construction,
but I hope to show here, that respective difficulties can be smoothed over. Of course, my construction
differs from theirs in some points
25this uniqueness may be viewed as a postulate
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5. the concrete particulars from the respective similarity sample(s) are said
to implement the concept cluster F to a certain degree, if they are similar
wrt F to the abstract particular i0 in that degree. Alternatively they are said
to participate in i0. The degree of similarity varies, but it’s never complete
similarity (this is guaranteed by the abstraction process determining the concept
cluster F), and it’s never non similarity, else they couldn’t be said to participate.
6. Certain knowledge is possible only wrt i0 as implementing F in full,
i.e., possible only wrt properties of the abstract particular i0. Knowledge of
concrete particulars, in some or other way only deficiently implementing the
concept cluster F, is only indirect, is given only in so far, as they participate in
i0. This latter consequence of Plato’s theory of forms, re-pictured here, is not
so uncommon or implausible as one might expect; to take a well known simple
example from classical mechanics: in a strict sense there are no (physically real)
inertial systems, but of course the Galilei/Newton law of inertia, defining this
concept.
7. The alleged difficulty of ’self predication’ amounts, if one accepts the con-
struct described so far, to nothing than a misunderstanding of logical structure.
The examples from the dialogues, Allen lists in his exposition, may easily be
understood as follows:
read being an F as meaning being to some degree similar wrt F to i0
And this applies to both, the abstract particular i0 as well as to any concrete
(e.g. sensible) particular implementing F. Of course, for i0 the unique abstract
particular having the character F in full, its similarity turns out to be identity
(thus similarity degree d = 1 in the similarity model, recalled in the beginning of
this paper). For concrete particulars, implementing F only to a certain degree,
the similarity is less, but nonetheless similarity ( thus in that model would be
pictured by a degree d with cos 60° = 0,5 ≤ d < 1 = cos 0° ).
And hence one can (with reference again to the geometrical similarity model)
roughly formalize the above given read of ’x being an F’ [for short bF(x)] as
bF(x) ⇌ ⋁d ( δSIMwrtF to i0 (x) = d ∧ cos 60° = 0,5 ≤ d ≤ 1 = cos 0° )
where δ is a function, taken to map the similarity wrt F to the geometric
similarity model. The important thing wrt ruling out the allegation of ’self
predication’, is the existential quantification [ ... being an F ... means ... there
is an similarity degree d, such that ... ]
8. Now, is there something to be said with respect to transitivity or non
transitivity of ’similarity wrt F’ ?
OK, in the first place this similarity is given between the abstract particular
i0 and any concrete particular x, implementing F in some degree. This scenario
is represented by the complex unary predicate bF(x). And the trivial equiva-
lence relation given with bF(x), viz. bF(x)↔ bF(y), is of course transitive.
But what about ’similarity wrt F’ between concrete particulars, say x and
y ? As F is typically a cluster concept, it may well be in limit cases that the
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intersection of the respective properties from F, the ones shared by x and the
ones shared by y is even empty. Thus, with respect to a domain constituted
by the abstract particular i0 and all related concrete particulars x there is no
good reason to expect the relation ’similarity wrt F’ in the general case to be
transitive.
9. At this point it might be helpful to recall, what formal explicata have
been correlated to which traditional terms in this (re-)construction so far:
cluster concept F
correlates to a Platonic form’s ’immanent character (μορφή)’ (Allen)
abstract particular i0, uniquely determined by F,
correlates to (is our formal analogon of) a Platonic form/idea (εἶδος / ἰδέα)
similarity degree δSIMwrtF to i0
correlates to ’participation/imitation (μέθεξις / μιμήσις)’
the complex unary predicate bF
correlates to ’being an F’,
which in turn correlates to Aristotle’s universal (καθόλου)
10. The reconstruction of the theory of forms, proposed here, does allow for
definition, does allow for certainty of knowledge, but both only for the abstract
particular i0, not for the participating concrete particulars; and thus prima facie
looks totally different from an Aristotelian concept of certain science, based on
certain first principles, formulated in general statements, employing universal
concepts (with supposedly definite extension).
5 off the record
degrees of reality ?
My (re-)construction considers rather explicitly Allen’s first ’fundamental
doctrine’ involved by the theory of forms, viz. ”(a) that the relation between
particulars and Forms is that of imitation, of copy to original” [1], p. 152, but
seems to neglect his second one, viz. ”(b) that Forms and particulars differ in
degree of reality”(ibid.).
Well, I did not really neglect this point, for I commented on degrees of
knowability (... certain knowledge only of the forms ...). And as I hold it a
perhaps problematic short circuit, to attribute to Plato identification of degrees
of knowability with degrees of reality, I stopped (only) short of that26.
in favor of the Meno
My confidence in the presented reconstruction is based to considerable ex-
tent on Plato’s presentation of the geometry example in the Meno (82b9-85b7),
26the text passages, Allen alludes to in favor of ’degrees of reality’ [[1] p.155 fn 18, fn 19], aren’t
decisive wrt this difference, e.g. Phaedo [15] 74d5-7 in my perception may very well be interpreted
as referring to ’degrees of knowability’, not necessarily implying reference to ’degrees of reality’
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which is usually considered as prominent example, where Plato argues for the
innateness thesis. May be, but much more important, in my perception, is the
accentuation of the role, geometry plays as the standard example for plausibility,
applicability and validity of the theory of forms/ideas as a theory of knowledge27.
The moment of Meno’s slave boy realizing the correct construction for doubling
the square is the moment of acquiring knowledge [but only, because he had no
education in geometry before] by successfully perceiving an aspect of the form
of a square28.
Whewell emerging from the history of the philosophy of science
My first perception of the Whewell-Mill debate was a quotation of two text
passages in ’A Wittgenstein Workbook’ by Christopher Coope, Peter Geach,
Timothy Potts and Roger White (Blackwell, Oxford 1970). The text passages
were assigned explicitly as a supporting material for the discussion of the later
Wittgenstein’s talk of language games as related by family resemblances in
”Philosophical Investigations”, obviously in order to give Wittgenstein’s refusal
to define his term ’language game’ some plausibility. For me29 not so much
Wittgenstein’s usage of the term ’Sprachspiel(language game)’ was puzzling,
but the logical question raised by the debate between Whewell and Mill. This
latter question seemed and seems to me more important in its own right.
6 summing up
I drew attention to the practical and to the epistemic role of (in general) non
transitive similarity relations by citing some examples, sure, lots of them could
be added, e.g. from the band with of cognitive sciences, including learning
and/or behavioral analysis. And I was asking for more due consideration of
them30 within contemporary epistemology.
With reference to a well known example, wavering throughout the history
of philosophy, I constructed an hopefully significant use case. But what is it,
that allows for such an use case of an item of ancient metaphysics, which has
not already been available at the time of Aristotle ? Or even to Late Middle
Age philosophers, ruminating (forgive me) the problem [in the way Aristotle
presented it] again and again ? The answer, that it is the availability of a
27Socrates climbing down in Meno[14]86b4-10 ”Meno: What you say commends itself to me,
Socrates, I know not how. Socrates: And so it does to me, Meno. Most of the points I have made
in support of my argument are not such as I can confidently assert; but that the belief in the duty
of inquiring after what we do not know will make us better and braver and less helpless than the
notion that there is not even a possibility of discovering what we do not know ...”, shows that the
core interest is the ’that’ of knowledge acquisition by perceiving a form, not some story about the
alleged causal chain (innateness etc.) for this ’that’.
28one should not be distracted from this perception by e.g. the report of Aristotle in [3] 987b14-
b18,viz. that Plato allegedly assigned an only intermediate ontological status to the objects of
mathematics between sensible things and forms, which view unfortunately had a late echo e.g. in
Proclus’ introduction to his Euclid commentary
29then the German translator of this nice booklet, translation appeared 1972 at Suhrkamp/Ffm.
as a supplementary (”Beiheft 2”) to their Wittgenstein-Edition
30more recently there has been some awareness of the role of non transitivity, viz. with some
scholars wrt the Sorites discussion see e.g. ”...our similarity-based semantics for first-order logic rests
on the idea that vagueness is tied in an essential way to non-transitivity, whether of indifference or
indiscriminability. In this, the framework agrees in particular with one of the central hypotheses of
Williamson’s epistemic theory of vagueness ...”[7] pp.383 f.
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comfortable formal tool, viz. 1st order logic, including logic of relations and
functions, is only part of the story. The perhaps as well important other part
of the story is, that in the age of industry and information technology (already
referred to) we are in a technologically superior position to realize not only the
ubiquity, but the objectivity of non transitive similarity (if we think e.g. of the
impact of the degree of similarity of the rolling elements (e.g. balls) on the
performance of a rolling bearing) 31.
The objectivity of non transitive similarity is expressed in the view that, even
with the best available knowledge, the most precise available measurements,
cases of non transitive similarity will not only remain to exist, but often will
be reproducible and/or predictable. Hence, the suggestion, that arguments
from non transitive similarity show principally a deficiency wrt knowledge [as
occasionally insinuated e.g. in the Sorites discussion], seems, from this point of
view, to be systematically misleading and in the end untenable.
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